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The Warsaw Convention: A Cat With Nine
Lives Walks the Plank One More Time
INTRODUCTION

here is a controversy lurking within the airline industry of
today.' International passengers' 2 claims arising from an
aviation accident 3 are subject to severe liability limits set forth

Consider the following scenario: You are returning home with your family from
I.
in the south of France. You have cleared customs in New York, and are
vacation
summer
a
on a flight bound for Los Angeles, your home. You are the sole breadwinner of the family.
In fact, the only reason your family was able to take this trip was due to your extensive
traveling for work. You had accumulated so many frequent flyer miles that the only costs
incurred on vacation would be land costs. So you decided to take the family to France to
experience a new culture, instead of doing the usual pilgrimage to Disneyworld.
During this domestic flight to Los Angeles you meet a couple across the aisle
and their children. They are returning from their trip to a large amusement park in Florida.
They normally spend their summers cruising the Mediterranean Sea on the family yacht, but
it seems the kids wanted to spend a summer someplace where their friends from school had
been before.
Take a moment to think the unthinkable in the context of the scene detailed
above. Suppose that plane was involved in a mishap upon landing that caused a fire and
subsequent evacuation. Some people made it out alive and some people didn't.
Unfortunately, the breadwinner of the family returning from France was not one of the
lucky ones. Equally unfortunately, the breadwinner of the family returning from
Disneyworld also perished. Unfortunate, no doubt, but will these losses of life really be
treated equally?
A traveler is considered an international passenger if he departs from one
2.
country that is a party to the Warsaw Convention and his final destination is in another
signatory country. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation By Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art.l, 49 STAT. 3000, 3014, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, 15
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. This is regardless of any stopping points made in
between that may result in one "leg" of a journey being completed entirely within a given
country. This international passenger status continues even if several successive air carriers
provide transportation. Id. 49 STAT. At 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15.
Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, a passenger may recover damages
3.
in the event of a death, wounding or other bodily injury if the accident causing the damage
happened on board the aircraft or "in the course of any operations of embarking or
disembarking." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17, 49 STAT. at 3018, 137 L.N.T.S.
at 23. The Supreme Court has defined the term "accident" as encompassing "an unexpected
or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger." Air France v. Saks, 470
U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
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in an international agreement, popularly known as the Warsaw Convention,
that became effective in the United States in 1934.4 These limits can only
be lifted if the airline is found guilty of willful misconduct in connection
with an accident.5
Few of us consider the possibility of being involved in an aviation
accident or disaster when we travel. There is, however, an increasing
awareness that international travelers need to consider the grimmest of
possibilities and take steps to educate themselves about the legal
ramifications of the Warsaw Convention liability limits. The amount of
damages they or their loved ones will be awarded in the aftermath of an
accident varies greatly depending on a travel itinerary.6
This paper will first summarize the history of the Warsaw Convention.
Next, the use of a subjective test to determine willful misconduct will be
examined. The issue of proving willful misconduct by an air carrier will
then be studied in the context of two recent cases. The first arose from the
crash of American Airlines flight 965 in the mountains surrounding Cali,
Colombia.7 The second stemmed from the death of a passenger in-flight on
an Olympic Airways flight from Athens to New York.8
Next, the intent of the United States Senate will be analyzed with
respect to its most recent action relating to the use of a subjective test to
establish willful misconduct. Finally, recent contracts between air carriers
to waive liability limits imposed by the Warsaw Convention will be
examined. Although these contracts may appear to make the whole issue
of a subjective versus an objective test irrelevant, there is reason to believe
such contracts may not be as helpful to the flying public as one may think. 9
In conclusion, an objective test to establish willful misconduct in the
context of a Warsaw Convention case will be advocated with an eye
towards achieving the most consistent and fair outcomes in scenarios
involving both international and domestic travelers.
Further, the
ratification of the 1999 Montreal Convention will be called for as the
appropriate means for modernizing the Warsaw Convention liability

4.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 502 (1967).
5.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25, para. 1, 49 STAT. at 3020, 137
L.N.T.S. at 27.
6.
See Penny Lewis, The GreatLottery in the Sky: Where You Go on Holiday and
Who You Fly with Affects the Amount of Compensation if You Have a Crash. Why the
Discrepancy?, INDEP. (London), Aug. 15, 2000, at 9.
7.
Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1277 (11 th Cir. 1999).
8. Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
9.
See Price v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (N.D. Ga.
2000).
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scheme and maintaining the uniformity of law that was the Warsaw
Convention's goal. In the interim period before the 1999 Montreal
Convention enters into force, legislation binding U.S. carriers to its terms
will be recommended. Finally, this article concludes with an addendum
written after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This addition to
the article analyzes the issue of the Warsaw Convention liability limits in
light of these tragic events.
I. HISTORY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The treaty known formally as the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, but more
frequently referred to as the Warsaw Convention, arose from a desire
amongst signatory countries to foster the growth of a fledgling international
commercial aviation industry.' 0 To help accomplish this, a multilateral
agreement was signed.
This agreement not only provided a uniform set of conditions for
transportation of passengers and cargo, but it also established liability
limits." These limits shielded air carriers from indeterminate judgments2 in
to its passengers.
the event of an accident that resulted in death or injury
As originally enacted, the Warsaw Convention limited liability in the
13
transportation of passengers to 125,000 francs. In exchange for this limit
on liability, the air carrier accepted liability regardless of fault for damages
up to the designated limit.' 4 The possibility of receiving compensation
above this limit did exist.' 5 However, the injured party was required to
show willful misconduct, or some act by the airline that, according to the
law of the jurisdiction where the case was submitted, was the equivalent to

See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1467 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing
10.
Minutes of the Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Oct. 4-12,
1929, Warsaw).
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22, 49 STAT. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at
11.
25.
Id.
12.
This was worth approximately $8,300. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I.
13.
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 499
(1967).
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee
14.

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: Accident Compensation in International

Transportation,63 J. AIRL. & CoM. 425, 426 (1997).
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22, 49 STAT. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at
15.
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willful misconduct.' 6 If the passenger did not prove willful misconduct, or
its equivalent, the airline could avail itself of the liability limit. 7
Although the passengers were benefited by the presumption of
negligence for claims below the liability limit, the limits themselves were
the source of great dissatisfaction,18 and ultimately led to a threat by the
United States to denounce the Warsaw Convention.' 9
An effort was launched to prevent a United States' withdrawal from
the Warsaw Convention. This effort was successful when an "interim"
agreement, known as the Montreal Agreement, was reached only two days
before the United States' notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention
was to become effective. 20
The Montreal Agreement applied to the claims of passengers on
participating carriers, traveling to or from the United States (or with an
agreed stopping point within the United States). 2' The agreement provided
for a $75,000 limit on liability, including costs of litigation, for an injured
passenger. Absolute liability would apply up to this new limit. 22
The agreement that spawned the U.S. withdrawal of its denunciation
of the treaty was labeled "interim" because it was agreed to as a temporary
solution in anticipation of a permanent amendment to the Warsaw
Convention itself, providing for a $100,000 limit.23 In spite of the intent
that the limit of $75,000 established in the 1960s should be temporary, that
limit remains applicable to this day.24

16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1468 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
19.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: Accident Compensation in International
Transportation,63 J. AIR L. & CoM. 425, 425 (1997).
20.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 596 (1967).
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at 597.
23.
Id. at 587.
24.
See 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
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The most recent change relating to U.S. passengers came on March 4,
1999 when the United States' ratification of the Montreal Protocol No. 4
The pertinent portion of the Protocol altered the
became effective.
language of Article 25 of the Warsaw convention.2 6 That article formerly
stated an air carrier could not avail itself of liability limits if damage was
caused by its willful misconduct. The new language states that liability
limits will not apply if "it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the carrier ... done with intent to cause damage or recklessly
The
and with knowledge that damage would probably result."27
significance of the change in language will be discussed in Part III.
Finally, in a continuing attempt to modernize the Warsaw Convention,
further change was proposed when signatory countries met at the 1999
Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air. The Montreal Convention imposes liability for damages
based on the condition that "the accident which caused the death or injury
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking. 28 For damages that do not exceed $135,000,
29 If a
the carrier "shall not be able to exclude or limit its liability."
plaintiff's damages exceed the amount of strict liability imposed, there
30
would be no liability limit imposed as in the Warsaw Convention.
However, the carrier could avoid liability in excess of $135,000 by proving
that "(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act
or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents; or (b) such damage was
solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third
party.'
In a letter to the United States Senate, President Clinton expressed his
support for the Montreal Convention and praised it as "a vast improvement
over the liability regime established under the Warsaw Convention and its
related instruments, relative to passenger rights in the event of an accident,"
John F. Schutty, New Wrinkles in an Old Treaty Governing Air Carrier
25.
Liability, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16, 1999, at i.
Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
26.
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October
1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955, Sept. 25, 1975,
art. IX, 22 I.L.M. 15, reprinted in LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION
ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK 351-62 (1988) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 4].
Id.
27.
Convention for the Unification of Rules for International Carriage by Air done
28.
at Montreal May 28, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-45, art. 17 [hereinafter The Montreal
Convention].
The Montreal Convention, supra note 28, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-45, art. 2 1.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
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because it "eliminates the cap on carrier liability to accident victims; [and]
holds carriers strictly liable for proven damages up to 100,000 SDRs
(approximately $135,000).y32

Although the Montreal Convention was signed by sixty-seven
countries on May 28, 1999, it will not come into force until sixty days after
thirty countries provide an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession 33 indicating the treaty has gone through proper political
channels of the respective countries, and the governments are willing to be
bound by its terms. Thus far, twelve countries have supplied such
documentation, and the United States is not among them.34
II. GETTING PAST THE LIABILITY LIMITS

In order to obtain damages in excess of the $75,000 limit, a plaintiff
originally had to establish that a carrier engaged in willful misconduct.35
The majority of earlier cases interpreting "willful misconduct" did not
require that the carrier subjectively intend to cause harm to the plaintiff in
36
order to waive the liability limit.

32.
President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, 146 CONG. REc. S8125-04.
Special Drawing Rights are an artificial currency developed by the International Monetary
Fund for internal accounting purposes to replace gold as a currency. The dollar equivalent
of 100,000 SDR is approximately $135,000. Id.
33.
According to the terms of the treaty itself, countries are required to provide
documentation of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession to this organization. The
Montreal Convention, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-45, art. 57. For a list of Signatory countries
to the Montreal Convention, see http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/mtl99.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2001). This is the web site for the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO).
34.
List of Signatory Countries to the Montreal Convention, at
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/mtl99.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2001).
35.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22, 49 STAT. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at
27.
36.
See Goldhirsch, supra note 26, at 121; see also American Airlines v. Ulen, 186
F.2d 529, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (finding willful misconduct means a deliberate purpose not
to discharge some duty necessary to safety); Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d
35, 37 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding an omission in a manner that implied reckless disregard for
probable consequences constituted willful misconduct); In re Disaster at Lockerbie
Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (ruling that reckless disregard of the fact that
injury and death would be a probable consequence of an act constituted willful misconduct).
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A. IS A SUBJECTIVE OR AN OBJECTIVE TEST APPROPRIATE?

Application of an objective test was a fair interpretation of the
language in the Warsaw Convention. In the case of an air disaster that
resulted in a crash and loss of life of the pilots, for example, it would be an
impossible burden to meet if required to show that the carrier or its agent
(in this scenario the deceased pilot) intended such a result.
Even in a recent crash where it is suspected that a pilot intentionally
dove a commercial passenger jet into the ocean on a suicide mission,37 in
the absence of a suicide note or other such direct evidence, that pilot's
intent will be a secret he took to his grave. Conversations on cockpit voice
recorders are not always perfectly discernable, particularly with multiple
parties speaking at once, and are often the subject of dispute in litigation. 38
In an analogous area, in the sense that it involves transportation of
others, it was well established in automobile guest statutes that the
definition of willful misconduct does not require an act intended to do
harm. It is sufficient that an act be done with wanton and reckless
disregard of its probable consequences. 39 This "objective test" approach
makes sense and produces more just results when applied to aviation
accidents.
Proving subjective intent in a plane crash is a prohibitive task. In light
of this, the rewording of Article 25 by the Montreal Protocol No. 440 and

Lee S. Kreindler, Millennium to Bring Revolution in Compensating Airline
37.
Crash Victims, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 2000, at 3.
See, e.g., In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia, 985 F. Supp. 1106, 1140 n.21
38.
(S.D. Fla. 1997) (involving parties to the lawsuit having different interpretations of what
was actually said on the recovered cockpit voice recorder).
See Gooseby v. Pinson Tire Co., 16 S.E.2d 767, 768-69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1941)
39.
(holding that behavior engaged in with a wanton disregard for its probable consequences
constitutes willful misconduct); Walker v. Bacon, 23 P.2d 520, 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933)
(finding a failure to do something that could be done under circumstances where such
failure would probably result in injury amounts to willful misconduct); Cope v. Davison,
180 P.2d 873, 876-78 (Cal. 1947) (holding an intent to injure someone is not necessary to
find willful misconduct).
Article 25 is reworded by Montreal Protocol No. 4 thus:
40.
In the carriage of passengers and baggage, the limits of liability
specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved that the damage
resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or agents,
done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that
damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of such act or
omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting
within the scope of his employment.
Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 26, art. IX, reprintedin Goldhirsch, supra note 26, at
358.
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subsequent interpretation that the new language imposes a subjective test
when analyzing carrier conduct 4' is a significantly unfair change.
B. THE SUBJECTIVE TEST APPLIED

On December 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965 crashed in the
mountains while attempting to land in Cali, Colombia, killing 160 people
on board.42 It was determined by Colombian officials, with the assistance
of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), that the crash was
due to pilot error.43
Plaintiffs, in the resulting lawsuits, sought to have the liability cap
waived based on the acts of the pilots leading up to the crash.4 The court
concluded "no reasonable jury could find that acts of the pilots of Flight
965... amounted to anything less than willful misconduct ....4'
Applying an objective test in this scenario, the conduct in question
would meet the required "willful misconduct" standard and the liability
limit would be waived. No reasonable pilot would violate the established
standards of care.46 The new language substituted for the "willful
misconduct" requirement produced a different outcome. If the question is
whether the pilots intended to cause harm, or behaved recklessly with the
knowledge that harm would likely result, the answer becomes a question of
fact for the jury. 47 There is no evidence to indicate the pilots subjectively
realized their acts would likely cause harm and disregarded such
realization. If this is true, the liability limit should not be waived.

41.
Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999).
42.
NTSB
Index
of
Aviation
Accidents,
available
at
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/DCA/96A020.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2001).
43.
Scott McCartney, Colombia Says Pilot Error was Cause of '95 Crash of
American Airlines Plane, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1996, at A9.
44.
In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia, 985 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
45.
Id. American Airlines acknowledged breach of applicable standards of care and
stipulated that the crash was "an avoidable controlled flight into terrain." Id. at 1110. The
pilots of Flight 965 became confused about their exact location while in a descent for
landing, yet continued to descend while in mountainous terrain. See id. at 1116-22
(analyzing transcripts from the cockpit voice recorder of Flight 965). This was a notable
breach of the standard of care that requires a pilot not to descend in mountainous terrain,
unless you know exactly where you are and the safe minimum altitude. Id. at 1114. Another
glaring error by the pilots was their failure to disengage the speed brakes after the on board
computer warned of the imminent impact with terrain. Id at 1122. This inhibited the
aircraft's ability to climb (and possibly clear the mountain). Id.
46.
Id. at 1109; see supra notes 39-40 for the standards of care.
47.
Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1293 (11 th Cir. 1999).
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The new language of the Montreal Protocol No. 4 would not result in
the waiver of a liability limit in a situation where pilots, flying in
mountainous terrain, carelessly lost track of their location and flew into a
This outcome appears to have the undesirable effect of
mountain.'
rewarding ignorance of the facts and careless behavior. It is illogical to
relieve an airline of the burden of financial reparations because their pilots
did not know what they were doing.
In Husain v. Olympic Airways,49 a man died in-flight as a result of
inhaling second-hand smoke that triggered respiratory distress and,
ultimately, led to his death.50 The court found that a subjective test was
appropriate.5 1 In this case, a flight attendant was informed of the
decedent's health problem and his need to be removed from the smoking
the
section. On numerous occasions, however, she refused to reseat
52
wife.
decedent's
the
from
pleas
urgent
increasingly
decedent despite
The court held that the liability limit should be waived based on the
behavior of a flight attendant.53 In reaching its conclusion, the Husain
evidence to substitute
court relied on inferences made from circumstantial
54
test.
subjective
the
of
intent
for the required
When the above cases are compared, the results of application of a
subjective test prove to be unfair and unsound. In one case, an airline is
shielded from extended liability because its pilots were unaware of their
proximity to the mountains, which it was their job to avoid in the first
place. In the second case, an airline was subjected to unlimited liability
because a flight attendant was extremely rude and unhelpful.
In the United Kingdom, the language of the Montreal Protocol No. 4
has also been interpreted as imposing a subjective test.5 5 The courts of the
United Kingdom have taken an even narrower approach in applying a
subjective test when determining if a carrier's acts will allow waiver of the
liability limit. In the United Kingdom the plaintiff must prove knowledge

E.g. Killick v. Harding, 2000 WL 491368, at *4 (Eng. CA. 2000) (discussing
48.
what constitutes probable knowledge of damage).
49.
Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F.2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
Id. at 1125-28.
50.
Id. at 1138.
51.
Idat 1125-26.
52.
53.
Idat 1138.
Id at 1138-39. The court did so based on precedent. See Cortes v. American
54.
Airlines, 177 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 78 F.3d 664, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)).
55.
Goldman v. Thai Airways, 1 WLR 1186 (Eng. C.A. 1983).
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at the time of the relevant acts or omissions in the sense of actual, not
attributed, knowledge that damage would probably result.56
This approach would have produced a different outcome in the Husain
case because the court there inferred the flight attendant's knowledge from
her acts. This would be exactly the "attributed knowledge" the courts in
the United Kingdom have held does not meet the standard required by their
interpretation of a subjective test.
While it is apparent from the position of the British courts that a
passenger's claim against an airline could be subjected to a less friendly
forum than that of a United States court, the U.S. approach still leaves
room for improvement. An objective test remains the best approach to
avoid the absurdity of allowing carriers to be shielded from liability by
pilot ignorance. Requiring a carrier to maintain a standard of
reasonableness is itself quite reasonable.

III.

ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE OF M6NTREAL PROTOCOL

No. 4

The legislative history leading to the Senate offering its advice and
consent to the Montreal Protocol No. 4 indicates that continued use of an
objective test in determining whether Article 25 requirements are met is
appropriate.
The Montreal Protocol No. 4 caused a shift in interpretation of Article
25 of the Warsaw Convention. The United States courts began to use a
subjective, not objective, test when analyzing air carrier behavior to
determine if awards in excess of Article 22 liability limits were warranted.
In light of this new approach, the view of the Senate in giving its advice
and consent to the Protocol is significant because the Senate had a different
interpretation of the language that would replace the term "willful
misconduct." Advice and consent was given based on evidence that there
would be no significant change to the scope of Article 25.
In its report to the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations stated
that, per the State Department, substitution of the new language for the
57
term "willful misconduct" would not change the scope of that standard.
In answer to a question from Senator Biden inquiring whether the executive
branch regarded this language change as modifying the scope of the willful
misconduct standard, the State Department responded that the new

56.
57.

Nugent v. Michael Goss Aviation, Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep 222, (Eng. C.A. 2000).
S. EXEC. REP. No. 105-20, at 15 (1998).
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language was "merely an alternative interpretation ' 58 and that it was "the
Executive Branch's view that this change does not modify the scope of the
standard." 59
Further, it was asked, "What is the practical effect of this language
change?" 6 To this, the State Department responded, "We believe that in
practice, there will be no difference between the old and the new
The State Department's answer went on to quote various
provisions.
definitions of willful misconduct that were said to represent its common
law definition.
The new language was meant to replace the words "willful
Included in relevant2
misconduct" with its common law definition.
Torts section 500,6
of
Second
Restatement
the
was
definitions provided
defining "reckless disregard of safety," which was said to be incorporated
into the amended Article 25.63 After citing this definition, the State
Department's response went on to say that, "In light of the above-quoted
definitions, it is our view that the amendment to Article 25 will have no
on the rights of claimants in cases under the Warsaw
practical effect
64
Convention."
It is apparent, from the passages of the Senate Report cited, that
advice and consent was given for the Montreal Protocol No. 4 based on an
impression that there would be no significant changes to the current
jurisprudence regarding the rights of claimants under Article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention. However, the Cortes court 65 stated it was "unable to
explain the inclusion of this citation in the Senate Report, as the

Id. at 47.
58.
Id.
59.
60. Id. at 52.
Id.
61.
62.
Section 500 of the Restatement provides:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or
intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his
conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
S. REP. No. 105-20, at 53 (1998).
63.
Id.
64.
The Cortes court was the first to rule that the new language in the Montreal
65.
Protocol No. 4 required a subjective test. It did so by reversing the In re Air Crash at Cali,
Colombia court's decision that an objective test was acceptable. This precedent was
followed in several cases. Brandt v. American Airlines, No. C 98-2089 SI, 2000 WL
288393, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2000); Perri v. Delta Airlines, 104 F. Supp. 2d 164, 169
(E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Restatement's definition is impossible to square with the express language
used in Montreal Protocol No. 4 ....,,66That court went on to ignore the
obvious objective component of this Restatement definition.
Giving words their "clear meaning" 67 (which is apparently what the
Cortes court intended to do) is more complicated when an international
treaty is implicated. Because of the different languages, customs and
perspectives involved in an international agreement, words may not readily
be given an ordinary meaning. 68 In such a case, the function of a tribunal
interpreting the language is simp91y to find out what sense of the words the
contracting parties agreed upon.
In the case of the words in the Montreal Protocol No. 4, the relevant
United States' parties whose interpretation would be influential are the
Executive Branch, by ratifying the Protocol, and the Senate, by giving their
advice and consent to the ratification. These parties attributed to the words
in question the same meaning given under the willful misconduct
language.7 ° Therefore, an objective test would remain appropriate.
The Cortes court looked to legislative history to establish the sense of
the words intended by the other countries and concluded that the parties
intended a subjective element.7' Yet the parties to the conference where
this language was originally composed were evenly divided between
whether or not a "knew, or should have known" standard should be
adopted, 72 and the minutes of the meeting do not explain what the text
ultimately adopted was intended to mean.73
There is no stated requirement of a subjective test in the Protocol
amending Article 25. Given the debate that swirled around that issue after
the Warsaw Convention first came into effect, 74 this absence is significant.
Lack of this clarification, the previous jurisprudence in the United States
indicating an objective test, and the executive and legislative intent75 not to

66.
Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999).
67.
"Clear meaning" denotes the interpretation of certain words, based on their
common usage that suggests an unambiguous design of contracting parties. YI-TING CHANG,
THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES BY JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS 22 (1933).
68.
See id.
69.
Id. at 22-23.
70.
See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
71.
Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999).
72.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. Rev. 497, 506 (1967).
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 503-04.
75.
"[T]hat the legislative will governs decisions on the construction of statutes
continues to be the test most often declared by courts." NoRMAN J.SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 (5th ed. 1992).
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change the scope of Article 25, all indicate the Cortes court would have
been well advised to continue application of an objective test. The duty of
override any formalistic
the courts to enforce the legislature's intent should
76
language.
of
interpretation
of
rules
to
adherence
Further, application of a subjective standard to certain aviation
disasters would produce unfair results. 77 Because a statute should be
interpreted in a way that would avoid hardship, if its language were
amenable to such a reading, the Montreal Protocol No. 4 should have been
interpreted as maintaining the ability of the courts of signatory countries to
apply an objective test when analyzing Article 25 claims.
IV. CONTRACTUAL WAIVER OF LIABILITY LIMITS BY AIR CARRIERS

Nearly all major air carriers have signed an agreement known as the

IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability. 79 This agreement

purports to waive liability limits imposed by the Warsaw Convention.
According to Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, the liability limit
otherwise imposed may be waived contractually.8 °

76.
"Legislative purpose and intent when obvious must be carried out irrespective
of rules of interpretation, as the intention of the law maker is the law." State v. Taplin, 247
A.2d 919, 922 (Me. 1968).
See text regarding pilot error and application of a subjective test in Part IV of
77.
this comment supra.
Anchorage v. Thomas, 624 P.2d 271, 273 (Alaska 1981).
78.
List of Carriers Signatory to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger
79.
Liability as of June 30, 1999, available at http://www.iata.org/legal/listcarrier.htm (last
visited Jan. 3, 2001).
"Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a
80.
higher limit of liability." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22, 49 STAT. at 3019, 137
L.N.T.S. at 25.
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The agreement was sponsored by the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), and claims to "[redefine] the legal basis of the
relationship between airlines and their passengers ' 81 by eliminating limits
to recovery of compensatory damages and providing for strict liability for
up to approximately $130,000 in damages.82 The language of the IATA
agreement itself acknowledges that the Warsaw Convention's limits of
liability are now "grossly inadequate in most countries. 83
This contractual agreement does not provide airline passengers with
the necessary relief from liability limits that fall short of actual damages
suffered because the agreement attempts to do by contract what can be
accomplished effectively only by law. 84 This flaw is evident in one issue
that has arisen: whether the
IATA agreement becomes effective
immediately upon signing, or whether a carrier must amend its tariff on file
with the Department of Transportation 85 before such agreement would
apply to any claim against the carrier.
When Korean Air Lines flight 801 crashed in Guam in August 1997,
Korean Air Lines had signed the IATA Agreement, but had not yet

81.
A Modernised Air Carrier Liability Regime, available at http://www.iata.org/
legal/ intercarrier-agreements.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
82.
Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement,
availableat http://www.iata.org/legal (last visited Nov. 7, 2001) (copy on file with author).
The Agreement provides:
1. Pursuant to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement of 31 October 1995, the
undersigned carriers agree to implement said Agreement by
incorporating in their conditions of carriage and tariffs, where
necessary, the following:
1.
[CARRIER] shall not invoke the limitation of liability in
Article 22(1) of the Convention as to any claim for recoverable
compensatory damages arising under Article 17 of the Convention.
2.
[CARRIER] shall not avail itself of any defence under
Article 20(1) of the Convention with respect to that portion of such
claim which does not exceed 100,000 SDRs...
3.
Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof,
[CARRIER] reserves all defences available under the Convention
to any such claim. With respect to third parties, the carrier also
reserves all rights of recourse against any other person, including
without limitation, rights of contribution and indemnity.
Id.
83.
Intercarrier
Agreements
on
Passenger
Liability,
available at
http://www.iata.org/legal (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
84.
Lee S. Kreindler, Millennium to Bring Revolution in Compensating Airline
Crash Victims, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 2000, at 3.
85.
Air carriers operating in the United States are required to file and obtain
approval of tariffs detailing their passenger contracts of carriage with the United States
Department of Transportation. 14 C.F.R. § 221.2 (1999).

2002]

A CAT WITH NINE LIVES WALKS THE PLANK ONE MORE TIME

incorporated it into its tariff on file with the Department of
Transportation. 86 The judge in that case held that the airline was
nevertheless liable under the IATA agreement.8 7
In Price v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines the same issue arose.88 The
plaintiff contended the IATA Agreement became binding at the time KLM
signed it.8 9 KLM asserted it merely reflected the intention of the carriers to
alter their contracts of carriage to reflect the terms contained in the
agreement. 9°
In this case, the court held in favor of the airline. In doing so, the
court looked at the language of the agreement itself. It states that the
undersigned agreed "to take action to waive the limitation of liability on
recoverable compensatory damages in Article 22 paragraph 1 of the
Warsaw Convention." 9' The Price court found that the very terms of the
IATA agreement anticipate further action by the carriers, beyond signing
the agreement. This indicated the agreement was intended as a contract
between the carriers themselves,
and not one between the individual
92
passengers.
their
and
carriers
Further, the court looked to the implementation of the Montreal
Agreement that raised liability limits specifically applicable to flights
operating in the United States to $75,00093 as evidence that further action
was required for the IATA agreement to become effective between carriers
and their passengers.
In order for those changes in liability to become effective, carriers
94
were required to file new tariffs with the Department of Transportation.
Also, without filing new tariffs implementing the IATA agreement, a
carrier was still subject to the tariffs currently on file with the Department

86.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The Egypt Air Crash: A First
View of the Law, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1999, at 1.
87.
Id.
88.
Price v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367 (N.D. Ga.
2000). In this case a passenger was injured when a drink cart struck her knees. The flight in
question was from Amsterdam, the Netherlands to Atlanta, Georgia so it fell under the
rubric of the Warsaw Convention. Id.
89.
Id. at 1370.

90.

91.
92.
93.
exercising
applicable
94.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 1371.
Recall that the Montreal Agreement prevented the United States from
its option to denounce the Warsaw Convention by changing liability limits
to U.S. flights only. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
Price, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
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of Transportation.
Those tariffs reflect the limits of the Montreal
Agreement of 1966 and would remain effective until changed.95
The Price court found the decision in In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam
unpersuasive because that court did not cite any case in support of its
analysis.96 The Price court also found the fact that the carriers do not
expressly waive anything in the language of the IATA agreement itself is a
persuasive reason97 for ruling that the agreement is amongst the carriers, not
with passengers.

95.

96.
97.

Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1374.
Id. The IATA agreement provides:

IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability
WHEREAS: The Warsaw Convention system is of great benefit to
international air transportation; and
NOTING THAT: The Convention's limits of liability, which
have not been amended since 1955, are now grossly
inadequate in most countries and that international airlines
have previously acted together to increase them to the benefit
of passengers;
The undersigned carriers agree:
1.
To take action to waive the limitation of liability on
recoverable compensatory damages in Article 22 paragraph 1 of
the Warsaw Convention* as to claims for death, wounding or other
bodily injury of a passenger within the meaning of Article 17 of the
Convention, so that recoverable compensatory dam4ges may be
determined and awarded by reference to the law of the domicile of
the passenger.
2.
To reserve all available defences pursuant to the provisions
of the Convention; nevertheless, any carrier may waive any
defense, including the waiver of any defence up to a specified
monetary amount of recoverable compensatory damages, as
circumstances may warrant.
3.
To reserve their rights of recourse against any other person,
including rights of contribution or indemnity, with respect to any
sums paid by the carrier.
4.
To encourage other airlines involved in the international
carriage of passengers to apply the terms of this Agreement to such
carriage.
5.
To implement the provisions of the Agreement no later than
1 November 1966 or upon receipt of requisite government
approvals, whichever is later.
6.
That nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights of the
passenger or the claimant otherwise available under the
Convention.
7.
That this Agreement may be signed in any number of
counterparts, all of which shall constitute one Agreement. Any
carrier may become a party to this Agreement by signing a
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Under this ruling, a carrier's failure to incorporate the terms of the
agreement into its contract of carriage with its passengers would easily go
unnoticed until a major accident occurred. At that time, the carrier might
choose to amend its tariff if pressured by public or industry sentiment.
However, filing after an incident would offer little relief to current litigants.
A preview of this trend came with the crash of the Egypt Air flight
where the pilot is suspected of intentionally putting the plane into a dive. 98
Initially, the airline acknowledged its signature of the IATA Agreement.
However, after the Price decision the airline claimed the IATA Agreement
might not bind it because it had not yet changed its tariff.99
There are other indications that the IATA Agreement offers only
illusory protection to passengers' rights because airlines do not necessarily
view it as binding. American Airlines provides an example of this. In a
press release, the Department of Transportation indicated American
Airlines had filed a tariff accepting the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. l°° In
spite of this, the company still warns passengers of liability limits in the
Warsaw Convention on its company website under the heading "Conditions
of Carriage."1 °1
A recent case involved a woman who was deplaning via mobile stairs
at Orly International Airport in Paris, France. The passenger fell down the
stairs to the tarmac below and suffered massive head injuries. She later died

counterpart hereof and depositing it with the Director General of
the International Air Transport Association (IATA).
8.
That any carrier party hereto may withdraw from this
Agreement by giving twelve (12) months' written notice of
withdrawal to the Director General of IATA and to the other
carriers parties to the Agreement.
*"WARSAW CONVENTION" as used herein means the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air signed at Warsaw, 12th October 1929, or that Convention as
amended at The Hague, 28' h September 1955, whichever may be
applicable.
Intercarrier Agreements on Passenger Liability, available at http://www.iata.org/legal (last
visited Nov. 7, 2001) (copy on file with author); see text of Agreement on Measures to
Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, supra note 82.
98.
Lee S. Kreindler, Millennium to Bring Revolution in Compensating Airline
Crash Victims, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 2000, at 3.
99.
Id.
100.
Press Release, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Carriers Implement
Agreements Waiving International Liability Limits (Feb. 7, 1997), available at
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/1997/dot1797.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
101.
American Airlines Conditions of Carriage, available at http://www.aa.com
(located in "corporate" pull-down menu) (last visited Nov. 7, 2001) (copy on file with
author).
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of these injuries.'0 2 Even though the accident occurred on May 10, 1998,103
after American Airlines had submitted changes to its tariffs,' °4 the carrier
still claimed, and the court agreed, that the Warsaw
Convention provided
05
the exclusive remedy for the plaintiff in that case.'
V. EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO LIABILITY LIMITS
The European Community has taken a leadership role in effecting
change where the current system of awarding damages to aviation disaster
victims has resulted in damage awards said to be "a pittance compared with
the real damages suffered."' 6
The Commission of the European
Communities has enacted legislation that does away with the antiquated7
Warsaw liability limits in much the same way the Montreal Convention'
will if it becomes international law. This legislation entered into force on
October 17, 1998.108
First, the regulation acknowledges that the "limit set on liability by the
Warsaw Convention is too low by today's economic and social standards
and often leads to lengthy legal actions which damage the image of air
transport."' 9 The regulation goes on to state that liability of a European
Community ("EC") air carrier resulting from the death, wounding, or other
bodily injury of a passenger in the event of an accident is not subject to any
financial limit."o

102.
Verdesca v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 3-99-CV-2022-BD, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15476, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2000).
103.
Id.
104.
Press Release, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Carriers Implement
Agreements Waiving International Liability Limits (Feb. 7, 1997), available at
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/1997/dotl797.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
105.
Verdesca, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15476, at *9.
106.
Lee S. Kreindler, Millennium to Bring Revolution in Compensating Airline
Crash Victims, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 2000, at 3.
107.
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
108.
Council Regulation 2027/97 on Air Carrier Liability in the Event of Accidents,
1997 O.J. (L 285)1.
109.
Council Regulation 2027/97 on Air Carrier Liability in the Event of Accidents,
preamble, 1997 O.J. (L 285)1.
110.
Council Regulation 2027/97 on Air Carrier Liability in the Event of Accidents,
art. 3, 1997 O.J. (L 285)1.
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Strict liability is imposed for damages up to the equivalent of 100,000
Special Drawing Rights ("SDR"). Il l An advancement of approximately
$10,000 is required no later than fifteen days after the identity of12a person
entitled to compensation under the regulation has been established."
Finally, the regulation requires that provisions regarding carrier
liability be included in the EC air carrier's conditions of carriage." 3 This
ensures there will be no loophole like the one that exists for carriers that
have signed the IATA agreement, but have not yet incorporated the terms
into their tariffs (or their conditions of carriage).
This EC regulation represents a sensible and timely solution to the
problem of antiquated liability schemes contained in the Warsaw
Convention. It remedies the liability problems pertaining to personal injury
claims without doing away with the facilitation
of international cargo
1 14
shipping afforded by the Warsaw Convention.
Congress should pass legislation mirroring the provisions of the
legislation, binding United States air carriers to its terms. Such legislation
would enact provisions set forth in the Montreal Convention. The
Montreal Convention will likely gain the advice and consent of the Senate
as Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, has
1 15
indicated he has no problem with it.
By enacting legislation that makes law the terms of the Montreal
Convention, Congress has the opportunity to extend the benefits of that
convention to the traveling public expeditiously. This would also serve to
make the advice and consent requirement a mere formality.
The advantage of this scenario, over that of letting the Montreal
Convention become international law, is that the United States would not
have to wait for thirty
countries to ratify the Montreal Convention before it
16
enters into force."

111.
Id. Special Drawing Rights are an artificial currency developed by the
International Monetary Fund for internal accounting purposes to replace gold as a currency.
The dollar equivalent of 100,000 SDR is approximately $135,000. President's Message to
the Senate Transmitting the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air, 146 CONG. REC. S8126.
112.
Council Regulation 2027/97 on Air Carrier Liability in the Event of Accidents,
art. 5, 1997 O.J. (L 285)1.
113.
Council Regulation 2027/97 on Air Carrier Liability in the Event of Accidents,
art. 6, 1997 O.J. (L 285)1.
114.
Cf. John F. Schutty, New Wrinkles in an Old Treaty Governing Air Carrier
Liability, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16, 1999, at 1.
115.

See Lee S. Kreindler, Millennium to Bring Revolution in CompensatingAirline

Crash Victims, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 2000, at 3.
116.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The time has come to put to rest the liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention. The limits were set at a time and under circumstances that are
so far removed from today's reality that they can only be considered totally
irrelevant. There is no longer a need to shelter the international aviation
industry to foster its growth, and injuries suffered by international
passengers are no less severe than those suffered by domestic passengers in
the event of an accident.
Aviation accidents, whether domestic or
international, should not provide for disparate levels of compensation.
Congress should take the same proactive approach exhibited by the
European Community by passing legislation removing liability limits and
imposing strict liability as reflected in the terms of the Montreal
Convention of 1999."7 In the mean time, the courts should apply an
objective test when analyzing whether the liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention should be waived in cases of personal injury resulting from
aviation accidents.

117.

See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
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Article Addendum
I. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

The terrorist attacks on American Airlines flights 11 and 77, and
United Airlines flights 93 and 175 have necessitated an addition to this
article as it entered the publication process. September 11, 2001 has
forever changed the lives of all Americans and, not surprisingly, the
aviation industry. The tragic events of September 11 currently eclipse
concerns expressed in this paper. However, those events will be analyzed
in the context of the topic addressed herein with an eye towards the
inevitable resurfacing of the debate on Warsaw Convention liability limits.
The main impact of the terrorist attacks on the arguments of this paper
is to call into question the aviation industry's ability to meet the increased
liability provided by the relevant European Union legislation, the U.S.
legislation called for by this paper, and the Montreal Convention of 1999.
This impact will be analyzed by examining Congressional action to shelter
the aviation industry, the effect on airline insurability, and the interaction
between the resulting legislation and the Warsaw Convention. The
conclusion will be drawn that, while the industry has suffered a setback, it
is only temporary. Airlines have been largely sheltered from liability
stemming from the terrorist attacks and remain insurable. The need to
eliminate the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention remains
compelling.
II. AIR TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND SYSTEM STABILIZATION ACT
On September 22, 2001 President George W. Bush signed into law the
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act [hereinafter
ATSSSA or the Act]. 118 Saving the commercial aviation industry was the
primary purpose of ATSSSA,11 according to House testimony. The Act's
purpose can also be readily inferred from its name.

118.
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115'STAT. 230 (2001).
119.
See 147 CONG. REc. H5875, H5877-81 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (testimony of
Rep. Dreier, Rep. Obey, Rep. Edwards).
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A. VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND

Within ATSSSA, however, Congress also provided what has been
called "a radical form of government compensation"' 20 for the victims of
h
the September 11 attacks. Title IV of ATSSSA, called the "September 1 I1
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001' ' "2i [hereinafter the Fund] allows
eligible claimants 22 to be compensated in an amount "based on the harm to
the claimant, the facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances of the
claimant"'' 23 without regard to issues of negligence or other theories of
125
liability. 12 4 Punitive damages will not be available from the Fund.
Damage awards under the Act will be determined by a Special Master
27
Kenneth R. Feinberg 26 who was appointed by the Attorney General.1
Any award from the Fund "shall be final and not subject to judicial
review."' 28 In exchange for certain recovery, claimants agree to waive all
rights to civil claims related to the injuries sustained, except those civil
suits necessary to collect funds from collateral sources. 129 The money
available from such collateral sources 130 will be deducted from the award

120.
Anthony J. Sebok, Assessing the New Airline Law: Not Just a Bailout but a
Huge Tort Reform Law, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20010924.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2001) (copy on file with author).
121.
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 10742, §
401, 115 STAT. 230 (2001).
122.
A claimant is defined as:
An individual who was present at the World Trade Center (New York,
New York), the Pentagon (Arlington, Virginia), or the site of the crash
at Shanksville, Pennsylvania at the time, or in the immediate aftermath,
of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001 and
suffered physical harm or death as a result of such an air crash.
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(c)(2),
115 STAT. 230, 239 (2001). A claimant is also an individual aboard any of the four flights
that crashed, excluding the terrorists. Id. Finally, a claimant may also be the personal
representative of a decedent who files a claim on behalf of that decedent. Id.
123.
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 10742, §
405(b)(l)(B)(ii), 115 STAT. 230, 238 (2001).
124.
Id. § 405(b)(2), 115 STAT. at 238.
125.
Id. § 405(b)(5), 115 STAT. at 239.
126.
Id. § 404(a), 115 STAT. at 237.
127.
Milo Geyelin, Overseeing September 11 Victim Fund Could be Lawyer's
Biggest Challenge,WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at BI.
128.
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 10742, §
405(b)(3), 115 STAT. 230, 239 (2001).
129.
Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i) and (ii), 115 STAT. at 23940.
130.
A collateral source includes life insurance, pension funds, death benefit
programs, and payments by Federal, State, or local governments related to the terrorist
attacks. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 107 P.L. No. 10742, §
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amount initially determined by the Special Master. The figure resulting
the claimant.13 '
after this calculation will be the amount actually paid to
The Special Master will have 120 days to make a determination of damages
has been made, payment
after a hearing. 132 Once a damages determination
33
will be authorized within twenty days.
As an alternative to recovery from the Fund, ATSSSA created the
34
option for an individual to file a federal cause of action.' The Act makes
this cause of action the exclusive civil remedy, and vests original and
exclusive jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. 5 The major question is whether the Act will
successfully lure claimants away from the traditional time-consuming and
unsure litigation process into the realm of certain recovery (albeit of an
uncertain amount) from the Fund.
Many claimants will likely proceed under the Act to obtain
compensation for several reasons. Not only is recovery assured, but none
of the monies received will be, of necessity, expended on legal
representation. Although a party may elect to be represented by counsel in
the process, it will not be required.3 6 Further, the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America ("ATLA") has formed a new non-profit organization
known as "Trial Lawyers Care.' 37 Through this group, Fund claimants
will receive free legal services provided by volunteer lawyers.' 38 Over one
thousand attorneys have already volunteered their services and ATLA
anticipates three thousand pro bono lawyers will be available to handle the
forthcoming claims. 9
This offer of free legal assistance is one more factor tipping the scales
in favor of recovering from the Fund as opposed to proceeding in federal
court. On one hand there is certain recovery, with free legal representation,
and a statutorily guaranteed expeditious process." 4° On the other hand,

402(4), 115 STAT. 230, 237 (2001).
Id. § 405(b)(6), 115 STAT. at 239.
131.

In such a hearing, the claimant will be entitled to be represented by counsel, has
132.
the right to present evidence including documents and witnesses, and will have such other
due process rights as are deemed appropriate by the Special Master. Id. § 405(b)(4), 115
STAT.

at 239.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. § 406(a), 115 STAT. at 240.
Id. § 408(b), 115 STAT. at 240-41.
Id.
See id. § 405(b)(4)(A), 115 STAT. at 239.
Emily Gest, Lawyers to Give Victims' Kin Free Help, N.Y.

138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Whether the timeline set out in ATSSSA is realistic remains to be seen.

18, 2001, at 40.

DAILY NEWS,

Oct.
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there is uncertain recovery, substantial attorney's fees, and slow-moving
court dockets. In the absence of substantial and promptly paid life
insurance policies, for many the choice between a federal lawsuit and
recovery from the Fund will fail to be a bona fide choice in the end.
Finally, in a provision that is somewhat ironically placed in the section
intended to provide for victim's compensation, Congress placed a cap on
airline liability stemming from the September 11 th crashes. The Act states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, liability for all
claims, whether for compensatory or punitive damages,
arising from the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of
September 11, 2001, against any air carrier shall not be in
an amount greater than the 1limits
of the liability coverage
41
maintained by the air carrier.
This language has the practical effect of ensuring the airlines will not
be called upon to expend their own capital to compensate victims. With
the prospect of massive litigation removed and liability capped at policy
limits, the only major problems the aviation industry is left to cope with are
a weakened economy and a greater number of fearful flyers. These
problems will dissipate over time and do not support the continuation of
Warsaw Convention liability limits.
B. IMPACT ON INSURANCE COVERAGE

The international aviation industry's ability to provide for the
unlimited liability advocated by this article is closely tied to insurance
coverage. After the terrorist acts that brought down four flights on
September 11th, the insurance industry opted to cancel act-of-war coverage
with one week's notice. 42 This is apparently not an uncommon move
during times of conflict as the insurance companies did the same during the
Gulf War.1 43
However, the terms of renewal under the current
circumstances have given rise to concern. 44 In the initial terms for renewal

However, when deciding whether to file a claim under the Fund, or file a lawsuit, the goals
set forth in the Act is what potential claimants (or litigants) will be contemplating.
141.
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §
408(a), 115 STAT. 230, 240 (2001).
142.
John D. McKinnon et al., U.S. Bailout Will Keep Airlines Flying Amid
Downturn, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2001, at A3.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.

2002]

A CAT WITH NINE LivEs WALKS THE PLANK ONE MoRE TIME

after September 11t', coverage was reduced from the previous $1.5 billion
to $50 million per aircraft. This new 45coverage was below that required by
banks and aircraft leasing companies.1
Congress, however, provided the industry with insurance relief in
ATSSSA as well. To prevent an aviation industry shutdown due to lack of
insurance, the Act, in effect, creates a government insurance policy to
cover acts of terrorism for 180 days following enactment.' 46 This was to
airlines time to work out coverage that met
give insurance companies
47 and
the needs of both sides.'
When renewal coverage terms are agreed upon, industry estimates
indicate the additional coverage will cost the airlines several dollars per
person per flight. 148 These increases are estimated to cost an extra $1.5
billion to $3 billion per year, depending on load factors. 149 The boosts in
premiums were also taken into account in ATSSSA, which provides for
reimbursement of insurance premium increases that directly result from the
September 11 incidents. 150 Whether or not the airlines are reimbursed for
such increases, premium hikes will not come out of the airlines' pockets
because they will undoubtedly be passed along to the consumer.
The insurability of airlines is not in jeopardy as a result of the
September 11 attacks. In fact, insurance company stocks "are selling near
their highest prices of recent years . . . [because] [a]nticipation of future
gains is replacing horror at current losses.''" The changes in coverage
necessitated by the acts of terrorism provide a dramatic illustration that the
airlines are able to provide for an increase in potential liability. If coverage
could accommodate such a dramatic shift in circumstances, it could
certainly accommodate the elimination of liability limits advocated by this
article. Insurers might even welcome the increased potential for liability as
another chance to stimulate insurance industry growth and prosperity. 152
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C. NEW LEGISLATION AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION

Some passengers aboard the ill-fated flights of September 11 may
have been Warsaw Convention passengers. An initial analysis of what
substantive law would apply to their claim is necessary. First, the language
of ATSSSA is instructive. In the portion providing for a federal cause of
action it states, "[t]he substantive law for decision in any such suit shall be
derived from the law, including choice of law principles, of the State in
which the crash occurred unless such law is inconsistent with or preempted
by Federal law."'153 This language points directly to the portion of the
Supremacy Clause that says "[t]reaties made ... under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Law of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding.'' 4 The Warsaw Convention is
such a treaty, and it will be the applicable substantive law if any
international passengers were aboard the flights that crashed on September
11.
Warsaw Convention passengers would have even greater incentive to
choose to recover under the Victim's Compensation Fund because of the
Convention's liability limits in the absence of willful misconduct. For nonWarsaw Convention passengers, the obvious incentive to choose litigation
over the Fund is the provision in the Act for offsetting any amounts
received from collateral sources such as life insurance. In a court of law,
such sources are traditionally ignored. There is also the hope that a jury
will give a larger award than a Special Master who may hear several
hundreds of cases. These concerns are irrelevant where a $75,000 limit to
recovery is in place.
Further, in light of the circumstances surrounding the September 11
crashes, any party to a lawsuit against the airlines would find it nearly
impossible to prove willful misconduct on the part of the airlines. Such a
showing would require the plaintiff to establish an airline knew the damage
that occurred would likely result from a reckless act of the airline or its
agent. 55 Even if it were proven that the hijackings resulted from a reckless
act by the airline, it is unlikely anyone would be charged with fathoming
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the elaborate scheme of simultaneously hijacking multiple aircrafts and
flying them into pre-selected buildings in a manner calculated to maximize
the death toll. In the history of aviation, such a scenario had never been
Past hijackings had always been committed with the
contemplated.
intention of using control of the aircraft, its crew, and passengers as
leverage to achieve some desired goal (i.e. the release of political
prisoners).'56
The plane crashes of September 11, 2001 are dramatic examples of
how unfair it is when passengers sitting shoulder to shoulder on the same
doomed flight suffer identical fates, yet the loved ones they leave behind
are not viewed equally under the law.
CONCLUSION

The aviation industry in this country seems to be in an unprecedented
state of financial peril. While every currently existing carrier may not
survive, the industry itself is essential to the functioning of our nation and
This paper, for all the reasons detailed above,
will not disappear.
advocates the elimination of liability limits imposed by the Warsaw
Convention. The events of September 11, 2001 provide a tragic and
dramatic illustration that the aviation industry can and should tolerate the
elimination of these limits on recovery.
TAMARA

A. MARSHALL

As a 12-year flight attendant for a major U.S. carrier, I am making this assertion
156.
based on the extensive security training I received upon being hired, and the subsequent
yearly training provided since that time where I studied past hijackings.

